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CASE NOTES

the specific purpose of rape statutes is to proscribe the punishment for
the offender, not to protect the female; and the penalty for the violation
of such a statute is often a large fine anl lengthy imprisonment in the
penitentiary, 28 which results in loss of reputation. Since statutory rape is
not a regulatory offense, 29 a mens rea must be required. Consequently, a
reasonable mistake of age, inasmuch as it negates a criminal intent, should
be a defense as allowed by the Hernandez case. 0
, The above analysis has pointed out that past decisions have eliminated
the element of criminal intent resulting :in gross injustices, and that to
disallow the defense of mistake of age is inconstant with the present
trend in the law. The defense of mistake of fact has been created by
case law and statute in the analogous crire of bigamy. From all indications, it appears that the Hernandez case may be the beginning of a
similar trend for statutory rape.
Sandy Kahn
28PA. STAT. tit. 18, 5 4721 (1939), which provides a fine of not more than $7000, or
imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or botE.
29

See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLO. L. REV. 55 (1933).

30 People v. Hernandez, supra note 4.

EVIDENCE-TORTS-STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF
PHYSICIAN TESTIFYING AS AN EXPERT WITNESS
A nine year old child, who broke her arm while playing, was given
emergency treatment in a hospital operated by the defendants. After the
course of treatment was completed, the plaintiff brought this action contending that due to improper medical attention her right arm had to be
amputated. Among other allegations, the plaintiff claimed that the physician who treated her improperly reduced the fracture in her arm, and was
subsequently negligent in not removing t ie cast despite severe pain and

swelling. In the trial court, Dr. Major, a practicing physician in San Francisco, California, was called as an expert medical witness on behalf of the
plaintiff, and was allowed to testify over the defendant's objections' Dr.
Major's testimony tended to prove the plaintiff's allegations of negligence.
' Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964), in reference to the witnesses' experi-

ence. Dr. Major was a graduate of Baylor University School of Medicine, and had
been engaged in the general practice of medicine for six and a half years in San
Francisco, California. Prior to that time he practiced with his two brothers in a
small Texas town where they operated a twenty bed hospital. Dr. Major had casted
between 120 and 150 fractures similar to the one in question and through his experience, reading, lectures and travels said that he was familiar with the practice in small
towns with regard to the treatment of fractures.
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The trial court returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendants
appealed on the grounds that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Major because he was not familiar with the standard of medical care prevailing in the small rural community of Kanab, Utah, where the
action arose. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964).
Since the expert, in order to give opinion evidence, must be qualified to
discuss any part of the field of interest to which the opinion will relate, by
induction, a change in the required qualifications of the expert will correspondingly indicate a change in the substance of this field of interest. As
related to the principal case, the following questions have arisen: Should a
physician who practices in the city with its vast medical facilities for learning and skill be permitted to testify as to the standard of care expected and
required from a physician who practices in a small rural community which
lacks these facilities? Ultimately, is the small town physician required to
.exercise the same degree of care as his counterpart in the city, in accordance with the so called "universal standard of care"? The Riley case represents the growing trend towards answering these questions in the affirmative.
Initially, the courts held that the standard of care required of a physician
was that of the average or ordinarily skilled practitioner in the same locality, being called the "strict locality rule."'2 A corollary or outgrowth of
this rule is the evidentiary rule, which may be stated as follows:
To qualify as such expert medical witness in a malpractice case against a
physician, the witness must not only show himself to possess learning and
knowledge of the subject of inquiry, sufficient to qualify him to speak with
authority on the subject, but also a familiarity with the treatment and degree
of care and skill of other practioners in the locality in question, sufficient to
qualify him to say whether or not the defendant's treatment was consistent
with what other practitioners in the exercise of reasonable care might do
under similar circumstances,
The weaknesses of the "strict locality rule" are quite apparent. For example, the establishing of a standard of care required of a defendant physican
in a malpractice action becomes unrealistic if there is only one physician in
the locality or if the only physicians in the locality are directly responsible
for the low standards in the community. Most of the courts have liberalized
the "strict locality rule," taking the position that the standard of care required of a physician is that of the ordinary average practitioner in the
2 Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021 (1938); Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah
262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943).
a Rasmussen v. Shickle, 4 Cal. App. 2d 426, 430, 41 P.2d 184, 186 (1935). (Emphasis

added.)
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same or similar locality. Thus, the corollary to this liberalized locality rule
allows the showing of competency of a :medical expert to be made by
showing that he has a familiarity with the standards prevailing in a particular locality or in a similar locality. 5
In Lockart v. Maclean,6 the court held that the physician was not qualified as an expert medical witness because he had obtained all his experience
in California, whereas the defendant was a Nevada physician. There is an
important distinction between the noted case and Lockart, as in the latter,
the medical procedure involved in the malpractice action was a very complicated one with varying standards of care all over the U.S. However, in
the noted case, the medical procedure was one which was uniformly established throughout the country. No speci,.l equipment or facilities were
needed which were not available in the small rural town of Kanab, Utah.
In the trial court the defendant admitted in his testimony that: "the standard of general practice in Kanab and Salt L .ke City is comparable, and that
the standard of practice for a general prctit.'oner is approximately the same
in Salt Lake City and San Francisco." In addition the record clearly shows
that the treatment of fractures is universally the same throughout the medi7
cal community.
As contrasted with the Lockart case, an expert medical witness from the
city was permitted in another case to testify in regard to the general practice in the state for the application and treatment of plaster casts, even
though he had never practiced where the action arose. The court said that
the standard of practice in such a matter does not materially differ in the
various areas of the state.8
Is this liberalized locality rule all important, or is it but one factor to be
considered? "The essential factor is knowledge of similarity of conditionsgeographical proximity being only one fictor to be considered." Also
note that the "locality in question is merely one of the circumstances, not
an absolute limit upon skill required."'10 When the locality rule was established it was sound in reason. The physician in a small community did
not have the same opportunities and resources for keeping abreast of
the advances in his profession, and it seemed just that he should not be
4 Hoover v. Goss, 2 Wash. 2d 237, 97 P.2d 689 (1940); Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284,
8 S.E. 2d 285 (1940).

5 Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
677 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961).
7 Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53, 57 (10th Cir. 194).

8 Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 Atl. 33 (1932).
9 See supra note 5.

1OMcGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 1131, 4" N.W.2d 121, 128 (1950).
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held to the same standard of skill and care as the city physician or surgeon."
"Today with the rapid methods of transportation and easy means of
communication, the horizons have been widened, and the duty of a doctor is not fulfilled merely by utilizing the means at hand in the particular
village where he is practicing."'12 Thus, the court has recognized that the
physician now has opportunities to keep abreast of advancements in his
profession that were not available before. Accordingly, the country
physician should not be judged only by the qualifications that other
physicians in the same or similar village possess. 18 It has been pointed
out that the small town physician is on a more equal basis with his city
brother as a result of frequent meetings of medical societies, articles in
medical journals, books by acknowledged authorities and extensive experience in hospital work. In one case the court instructed the jury that:
the defendant was required to exercise such reasonable care and skill as an
ordinary physician or surgeon in good standing would exercise in like circumstances and that one of14 the circumstances to be considered was the locality
where the action arose.
In the text Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases,15 the authors indicate
that in the United States today there seldom arises a question of variation
of medical standards, except when an urban area is contrasted with the
standards of an area which is very rural in nature, and these authors
conclude that even this contrast is of diminishing significance. The truth

seems to be that the courts are becoming increasingly aware of the reality
that medical standards are approaching nationwide uniformity. It would
seem the rule requiring a physician to meet up to only the standards of
his locality or a similar locality is a relic of the past. Certainly the remoteness of the locale must be taken into consideration in determining
whether a physician's actions were negligent, but the locality rule should
not be a shield used to protect a physician who, perhaps because of a
self-imposed isolation, has blinded himself to the progress of his profession
and thus established for himself a defense in a malpractice action. If a
physician practices in an area which lacks the facilities regarded as standard in other areas, he should be knowledgeable enough to advise his patients, when necessary, that superior medical talent and facilities are in
existence elsewhere. 16
11Warnock v. Kraft, 85 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1938).

12Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 349, 294 N.W. 183, 188 (1940).
'3 Vita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916).
14 Id. at 1081, 155 N.W. at 1077.
15 LouISELL AND WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE: 806.

16 Ibid.
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If the standard of care can be properly induced, the Riley case represents the growing trend towards a realistic viewpoint of what standard
of care and skill is required of a physician and surgeon in the U.S. today.
A physician today should not be required to meet only the standard
set by other physicians in his locality-but should be required to have
such skill as capable members of the profession ordinarily possess under
similar circumstances, and one of these circumstances is his locality
and the opportunities it affords for keeping abreast of advances in medical
knowledge and science. Accordingly, the requirements of a physician to
act as an expert witness should be similarly established.
Richard Spiwak

FAIR TRADE-VALIDITY OF DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER TO PRIVATE PERSONS
The proponents of the fair trade laws lost another round in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a lower court, overturning one of its own previous opinions,' by holding invalid the nonsigner provision of the fair trade law. The plaintiff manufacturer had
sought to enjoin a retailer from cutting the price of the manufacturer's
trademarked product, basing its case on a price maintenance contract
which the plaintiff had obtained from another retailer. Under the nonsigner provision, 2 all retailers are compelled to charge the minimum price
specified in the fair trade contract, even though not parties to the
contract. The court ruled that the injunction should not be issued because the non-signer provision delegates legislative power to private
persons, in violation of the state constituticn.3 Thus Pennsylvania became
4
the twenty-third state to hold the non-signer provision unconstitutional.
Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 369, 115 A.2d 361 (1955).
Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act, PA. STAT. tit. 73, !j8 (1935): "Wilfully and knowingly
advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated
in any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of section one of this act,
whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is, or is not, a party
to such contract, is unfair competition and is ac:ionable at the suit of such vendor,
buyer or purchaser of such commodity."
a PA. CONST. art. II, § 1: "The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested
in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."
4 See U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1961). See also Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 108 N.W.2d 365 (1961); Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v.
Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 139 Mont 15, 359 P.2d 6z4 (1961); American Home Products
Corp. v. Benny Homsey & Assoc., 361 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961); Bulova Watch Co. v.
Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1962).
1Burche

2

